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The  objectives  of  this  paper  are  to  highlight  some  of  the  potential  and  limitations of
microinsurance in the context of  Social Risk Management (SRM) framework to stimulate further
discussion. The paper draws on existing literature on SRM and microinsurance.  Where relevant, it
invokes lessons from microfinance.
The authors conclude that there is potential for efficient and equitable risk management through
microinsurance, but also limitations. Microinsurance  may be an acceptable means of managing a
few limited forms of risk, but not all.  SRM practitioners need to recognize that effectiveness of
any  risk  management  instrument depends  on  the  nature  of  risks,  household  and  group
characteristics and dynamics, and the availability  of altemative risk management options.
SRM options should strike a balance between household risk management activities and the
multiple instruments available at different institutional levels, including informal, market-based,
and publicly provided mechanisms. Microinsurance is a potential part of the SRM toolbox, but
risk management can be enhanced through different mechanisms or combinations of them.
KEY WORDS
social risk management, microinsurance,  insurance, microfinance,  vulnerability,  poverty.EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Social risk management (SRM) is the guiding framework for the World Bank Social
Protection Unit's Sector Strategy Paper, which focuses on how poor households manage
risk.  There has been increased interest in using finance-based means of managing risk
for poor households. New evidence shows that the "finance trinity"-savings,  credit, and
insurance-can  be used to assist capital accumulation, help smooth consumption, and
improve risk-bearing.  Traditionally, a major constraint to the supply of finance-based
instruments to vulnerable households is the high transactions costs associated with their
delivery, along with costs related to asymmetric information such as moral hazard and
adverse selection, and the lack of  collateral.  Microinsurance is, to  some extent, an
extension of the microfinance model into the realm of insurance.  Also, many of the
pioneering attempts to provide microinsurance have been closely linked to microfinance
programs and MFIs.
The objective of this paper  is to  highlight some of  the potential  and  limitations of
microinsurance in the context of the SRM framework and stimulate further discussion.
The paper draws on  existing reports on SRM and microinsurance. Where relevant it
draws on lessons from the microfinance literature.
The authors conclude that there is potential for efficient and equitable risk management
through microinsurance, but  also limitations.  Microinsurance may be  an  acceptable
means of managing a few limited forms of risk, but not all.  SRM practitioners need to
recognize that the effectiveness of any risk management instrument will depend on the
nature of risks, household and group characteristics,  their dynamics, and the availability
of alternative risk management options.
SRM options should strike a balance between household risk management activities and
the multiple instruments available at different institutional levels, including informal,
market-based, and publicly provided mechanisms. Microinsurance is a potential part of
the SRM toolbox, but risk management can be enhanced through different mechanisms or
combinations of them. Thus, it is  important to understand some of  the attributes of
microinsurance in order to identify its position within the SRM framework.VIEWING  MICROINSURANCE  AS A SOCIAL RISK MANAGEMENT
INSTRUMENT:  Potential and Limitations*
I.  INTRODUCTION
As a result of economic and political liberalization, globalization among other
forces, households' tend to face more risks 2 now than in the past (World Bank, 2000;
World Bank, 2001). The rapid and profound economic,  political and social changes have
placed stress on traditional social arrangements that served as informal safety nets. At the
same time, acute fiscal constraints in  many countries have led to cutbacks in public
expenditures for social services and fornal  safety net programs. 3 Due to increase risks
faced and decreased ability to manage risks, many poor and near-poor households are
expressing anxiety about their perceived "vulnerability" (Narayan, 2000).
There has been increased attention at the World Bank regarding the relationship
between poverty, risk and efforts to manage risk. This focus on risk is evidenced by the
empowerment-security-opportunity  framework presented in the World Development
Report 2000/1 (World Bank, 2000a), and the social risk management framework that is
the foundation of the Social Protection Unit's  Sectoral Strategy Paper (World Bank,
2001).  The "social risk management" (SRM) approach (Holzmann and Jorgensen, 1999,
2000; Holzmann, 2001; World Bank, 2001) concerns itself with how, and with what
*Jeffrey Alwang is a Professor at Virgina Tech, Paul B. Siegel is a Consultant at the Social Protection  Unit
in The World Bank, and Sudharshan Canagarajah is a Senior Economist at the Social Protection Unint in
the  World Bank.  The authors  would like to  express their  appreciation for  detailed comments and
suggestions received from  four reviewers of  this paper:  Johannes Juetting (Center for Development
Research, Bonn, Germany), Michael McCord  (Senior  Technical  Advisor,  MicroSave Africa), Vijay
Kalavakonda (Financial Sector Development, World Bank), and John Blomquist (Social Protection Unit,
World Bank), The authors, however, accept responsibility for the contents of this paper.
' In this paper we use the term "households"  to include both the household unit and individuals within  the
household. Admitedly  there are important  differences between a household and individual  perspective,
especially intra-household  dynamics that can affect the risks and risk management capabilities  of individual
household members  (e.g., gender and age based differences).
2 Some risky events  are individual  or household specific (i.e., idiosyncratic  risk such as illness), while
others simultaneously  affect many households in a community or region (i.e., covariate risk such as
economic or weather-related  shocks). In the literature some authors point out differences between risk and
uncertainty, while others argue that they are interchangeable. In this paper, we assume that they are
interchangeable  (see Siegel and Alwang, 1999, p.3).instruments, society manages risks.  Hence, SRM refers to the social management of risk
and not to the management of social risks,- with a focus on the poor.
SRM  promotes  proactive  ex  ante  risk  management strategies  such  as  risk
reduction and risk mitigation as substitutes and/or complements to reactive ex post risk
coping 4. The SRM approach considers a broad spectrum of options for risk management
ranging from private and informal to public and formal mechanisms.  These instruments
help households manage risk, with  interactions and linkages from  the household up
through  community, regional,  national, and  international levels  (see  Holzmann and
Jorgensen, 1999; 2000; Siegel and Alwang, 1999).  Financial and insurance instruments
are possible components of an integrated SRM strategy.
Increased interest has emerged for using finance-based means of managing risk
for vulnerable households. 5 New evidence shows that the "finance trinity"-savings,
credit, and  insurance-can  be  used  to  assist capital  accumulation, to  help smooth
consumption, and improve risk-bearing (Zeller, et. al. 1997; Sebstad and Cohen, 1999;
Rutherford, 2000).  A major constraint to the supply of finance-based instruments to
vulnerable households is the high transactions costs associated with their delivery, along
with problems related to  asymmetric information such as moral hazard and adverse
selection,  and  the  lack  of  collateral.  Microfinance  programs  and  microfinance
institutions (MFIs) - which cater mostly to the poor and the informal economy 6 - have
proliferated in recent  years.  A major feature of most MFIs is that they provide ar.
institutional structure to  aggregate  their  "micro"  clients'  demands for  finance and
simplify the design and delivery of finance services by organizing members into a group
or association (see box, below).  MFIs combine aspects of both formal and informal
3 Among the world population of 6 billion, less than a quarter has access to formal social protection
programs (Holzmann, 2001).
4 In the SRM framework, risk reduction and risk mitigation can complement "good" risk coping practices,
but substitute (i.e. "crowd out") for destructive or "bad" practices. For example, removing children from
school to cope with adverse outcomes is one "bad"  practice that might be crowded out.
The poor desire a range of financial services to address different needs, including working and investment
capital, funds to cover lifecycle events, health, education and housing related expenses, loans for
consumption  smoothing, and emergency loans in times of crises and disasters (Rutherford,  2000).
6  The informal economy includes owner operators of small unregistered businesses, self-employed,  and
wage workers. Most of the rural economy and about 50% of the urban economy in LDCs can be
considered as part of the infornal economy. Not all households in the informal economy are poor
Although there is a high degree of overlap.  However, even non-poor households in the informal economy
often  have difficulties accessing formal finance and insurance instruments  (see World Bank, 2000b)
2finance mechanisms (Juetting, 1999).7 MFI programs have been perceived as a qualified
success in  terms  of  providing financial services  to  poor  households and  financial
sustainability (see  Murdoch  1999;2000).8  Microinsurance is,  to  some  extent,  an
extension of the microfinance concept into the realm of insurance -to deal explicitly with
risk management. Many of the pioneering attempts to provide microinsurance  have been
closely linked to existing microfinance programs and MFIs, because existing networks
make it less costly to deliver microinsurance  products. (Brown and McCord, 2000).
Microinsurance can be a key component of an SRM-based strategy, especially
when  credit  and  savings  services are also  available concurrently.  However, SRM
practitioners need to recognize that the effectiveness of any risk management instrument
will depend on the nature of risks, household and group characteristics  and dynamics, and
the availability of alternative risk management options.
The objective of this paper  is to use the SRM framework to highlight some of the
potential and limitations of microinsurance and stimulate further discussion. The paper is
informed by existing reports on SRM and microinsurance.  9  Where relevant, it draws on
lessons from the microfinance literature.
The SRM framework is  explored in the next section where we focus on the
definition  of  household  vulnerability,  risks,  risk  responses  and  outcomes.  Then
microinsurance  is viewed as a potential SRM tool to reduce vulnerability. Next, a section
examines some basic insurance principles and their relevance for microinsurance. Links
between microfinance and microinsurance  are then described, followed  by a section
devoted exclusively to microinsurance  issues. Finally, there is a concluding section.
For example,  use  of group  liability  as a substitute  for formal  collateral.
MFIs  have  had mixed  records  in  reaching  the poorest  households  and  in terms  of financial  viability.
9For  detailed  information  on  the SRM  framework  see Holzmann  and  Jorgensen  1999;2000;  World  Bank,
2001  and  www.worldbank.org/sp.  For  detailed  information  on microinsurance  see Brown  and  Churchill,
2000;  UNCDF,  2000;  Brown  and McCord,  2001;  and  www.mip.org;  www.c2ap.or2;
www.microinsurancecentre.org..
3What is "Micro"  about Microfinance and Microinsurance?
The "micro" refers to the type or size of transaction. The terms finance (e.g., credit,
savings) or insurance refer to the type of financial instrument. Microfinance (MF)
and microinsurance  (MI) instruments  are designed for low-income  households who
transact relatively small amounts of financial services. They usually can not directly
access formal finance or insurance instruments because of high transactions  costs,
along with problems of moral hazard and adverse selection, lack of collateral, etc.
MF and MI are attempts to aggregate the "micro" clients into a group or association
and to simplify  the design of the instruments in order to lower transaction costs and
other problems using a combination of formal and informal  finance and insurance
arrangements  (see Dror and Jacquier, 1999; Juetting, 1999; Brown, et. al., 2000).
II.  VULNERABILITY  AND SOCIAL  RISK  MANAGEMENT
We begin by discussing  the concept  of household  vulnerability'°  and how  it is
related  to  actions  to manage  risk  within  the  SRM framework."  Vulnerability  can be
decomposed  into several components  of a "risk chain":  a) the risk, or risky  events,  b)
the  options  for  managing  risk,  or the risk  responses,  and  c) the  outcome  in terms  of
welfare  loss.  A household  is vulnerable  to suffering  an undesirable  outcome,  and this
vulnerability  to a welfare  loss comesftom  risks.
Household Vulnerability Defined
A household can be vulnerable to future loss of welfare below socially accepted norms
caused by risky events.  The degree of vulnerability depends on the characteristics  of the
risk and the household's ability to respond  to risk. Ability to respond to risk depends on
household characteristics  - notably their asset-base (broadly defined). The outcome is
defined with respect to some benchmark-a  socially accepted  minimum reference level of
welfare (e.g., falling below the poverty line). Vulnerability also depends on the time
horizon - a household may be vulnerable to risks over the next month, year, etc.
Vulnerability  begins  with  a  notion  of  risk.  It  is  assumed  that  the  risk  is
characterized  by  a probability  distribution  of events.'2 Households  can respond  to,  or
manage,  risks  in  several  ways.  They  can use  formal  and  informal  risk  management
'° We  use the term households  to include  individuals  and households.  The  vulnerability  of individuals
within a household and intra-household  dynamics can also be important  to understanding  household
vulnerability.
" See Alwang, Siegel and Jorgensen (2000;2001) and Holzmann  (2001) for more details.
12 These events are themselves characterized  by their magnitude (including size and spread), their
frequency and duration, and their history - all of which affect vulnerability from the risk.
4instruments, depending on their access to these instruments. 13 Following Holzmann
and Jorgensen (1999; 2000), it is possible to separate risk management into ex ante and
ex post actions. Ex ante actions are taken before a risky event takes place, and ex post
management takes place after its realization.  Ex  ante risk reduction strategies can
reduce or  eliminate risk  (e.g., eradication of  malaria-bearing mosquitos) or  lower
exposure to risks (e.g., malaria pills, mosquito nets).  It is also possible for a household
to take ex ante risk mitigation actions that provide for compensation in the case of loss.
Risk mitigation includes formal and informal responses to expected losses such as self-
insurance (e.g., precautionary savings in financial or other assets), social networks and
formal insurance.  Ex post risk coping activities are responses that take place after a
risky event is realized and involve activities to deal with realized losses such as such as
selling assets, seeking "emergency" loans (from relatives and friends, moneylenders,
banks), removing children from school, migration of selected family members, seeking
temporary employment.  Some governments  provide formal safety nets such as public
works programs, food aid, and other transfers that can help households cope with risk.
Risk, combined with the household responses lead to the outcome.  The outcome
of  the risk  and risk  response process, in terms  of welfare loss relative to  a  given
benchmark' 4 (e.g., falling below the poverty line), is a major interest of social policy.
Vulnerability is the forward-looking state of expected outcomes, and the existence or
absence of welfare losses in one period are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for
the existence of vulnerability in the future.  A household might be able to mitigate or
cope with a risk (or set of risks) in a given period, but the process can result in limited
ability to manage risk in subsequent  periods, especially when assets (broadly defined) are
degraded (see Siegel and Alwang, 1999).
Improved  mitigation (e.g., using microinsurance)  might be preferred to relying on
ex post coping, but mitigation only provides compensation  for losses after the household
13 Examples of formal  financial risk management tools include loans with flexible repayment schedules,
emergency loans, savings,  and insurance. Informal  financial risk management tools include burial
societies, ROSCAS (rotating savings and credit associations),  moneylenders,  and mutual aid.
'4  Welfare losses, in and of themselves, are not sufficient  to identify a household as vulnerable.
Vulnerability is associated with those welfare losses that leave a household below a socially defined
minimum level.
5is impacted by a risky event." 5 Compensation for losses, particularly in the case of MI, is
usually less than the  actual losses suffered - so households must  resort to  coping
strategies to compensate for remaining losses. Risk mitigation might prevent a household
from falling below the poverty line in a given period, but it might increase household
vulnerability in the future.  Improved risk mitigation might be preferred to risk copina,
but in both cases losses are suffered.
Actions to manage risk can take place at different forms and levels, and these
actions can affect risk and vulnerability at other levels (see Holzmann and Jorgensen,
1999, 2000; Siegel and Alwang, 1999).  The levels are: micro (individual, household);
meso (community, local government); macro (regional, national government); and global
(multinational, international). Policy options taken  at higher institutional levels may
lower or increase risk or strengthen or weaken risk management capability at lower levels
For example, community investments in sanitation can reduce household risk of disease.
Investments at higher levels can also better enable institutions at lower levels to respond
to and manage risks.  For instance, international disaster relief programs help households
cope with risks, and disaster preparedness programs reduce exposure of communities  and
households to risks.
SRM practices can intervene at any  of these levels, and the optimal level of
intervention depends on the characteristics of the risk, the characteristics of the "thing"
(i.e., asset  stock,  income  flow)  at risk,  and  the  web  of  formal and  informal risk
management  practices.  Take  the  case  of  health  risks,  for  example.  Health risk
management could be enhanced by micro-health insurance, or by expanded sanitation
coverage, improved immunization, community health education, etc.  The optimal risk
management  practice depends on alternatives at different levels and their costs.  See
Annex I and 2 for more detailed examples of the risk chain and risk management options
at different levels.
Much  of  the recent  interest  in  microinsurance has  been due  to  the lack  of
governments taking an  active role in  risk reduction and also their lack of providing
15 Risk mitigation  can be considered an ex ante contractual arrangement (either formal or informal)  that
specifies some compensation for losses, while risk coping includes actions by households in response  to a
risky event.  Since risk mitigation usually only provides partial compensation  for losses, households  need to
cope with means to compensate for the remaining losses.
6formal safety nets.  The provision  of  formal safety nets  might actually crowd out
alternative household risk management practices (e.g., risk  reduction or mitigation),
because the household might think it can depend on the government, donors or NGOS to
help them in times of crisis.  However, formal safety nets are usually not provided in a
transparent and timely manner limiting their effectiveness. Vulnerable households might
not  be able to  afford the "luxury"  of devoting scarce resources to  risk reduction or
mitigation.
SRM recognizes a wide range of policies, investments, institutional changes, etc.
that can be considered in a holistic risk management approach. One path to improve risk
management is  to  enable vulnerable households to  access a  wider  range of  formal
financial instruments.  These instruments should, where possible, strengthen and/or be
linked to informal arrangements. This is mostly the case of microinsurance.
III.  MICROINSURANCE  AS A POTENTIAL  SRM TOOL
A major motivation for SRM interest in MI is that certain households have been
excluded from existing insurance schemes because: a) formal insurers have done little to
reach out to those segments that are outside the mainstream formal economy (e.g., low
income households, informal sector, rural households) of the populations; b) the excluded
groups lack the empowerment and capacity to access formal insurance, c) there is a need
to expand and strengthen risk and resource pooling at different levels to help excluded
households take advantage of the potential benefits of risk and resource pooling.
The first reason is related to the viability of privately supplied insurance products
in an environment characterized by imperfect information and high transactions costs.
Groups and associations of households can be used to gather information and reduce
transaction costs and make micro clients more attractive to private insurers and/or to
allow them to organize as an insurance mutual.  The second reason holds out promise
that, in addition to better enabling clients to manage risk, MI can help empower groups
and associations which helps them access improved insurance services and possibly has
other  benefits.  Another  dimension of  empowerment is  social inclusion, whereby
households outside groups and  associations might  achieve improved access to  risk
7management instruments either as individuals or as members of groups. 16 The third
reason is related to the concept of risk and resource pooling, which are the foundation of
insurance as a mechanism for "risk transfer".  Poor households and those in the informal
economy often lack access to broader risk and resource pools because of  their economic
or geographic remoteness and/or their poverty, and lack of inforrnation on the side of
both the households and potential insurers. Households outside the mainstream economy
need assistance in order to attain similar risk management capabilities.  This assistance
might  include improved  access to  risk  and  resource pools for  both  insurance and
reinsurance. Better  information about these  excluded groups can  make  them  more
accessible as clients to insurers and re-insurers.
All these reasons help justify a public sector role in facilitating MI. Government
clearly has a role in addressing market and information failures, and empowerment has
many dimensions of a public good. Empowerment, in turn, can help facilitate efforts
aimed  at  risk  reduction  (e.g.,  community  improvements in  water  and  sanitation
infrastructure).  There  is  a  strong rationale  for  government assistance to  provide
information and technical assistance for households to access broader risk pools and/or
subsidize some of the costs of insurance as part of a pro-poor policy - especially in the
case of govermment  failure to provide basic public goods and services. 17
It is important to understand some of the attributes of MI in order to identify its
position within the SRM framework.  As noted in a recent critique of microinsurance
(Brown, et. al., 2000, p.5): "Before  rushing to jump  on the insurance bandwagon,  .. .{it is
important to} consider three  questions regarding microinsurance: 1) do clients want
assistance in  reducing vulnerability to  the risks to  be  covered by  insurance?, 2) is
insurance the most appropriate financial service for providing protection?, and 3) are
clients  willing  and  able  to  pay  a  price  at  which  the  insurance  can  be  delivered
profitably?"  The issue of  so.ial  inclusion, including the targeting of poor  socially
excluded households is also important.
16 A major problem of some efforts aimed at empowering  groups is that the poorest households are often
excluded from such existing social nertworks. For example, Juetting and Tine (2000) point to evidence
from Senegal (West  Africa) indicating that community-based  "health mutuals"  have not been able to insure
the socially excluded.
17 Some governments  are interested in MI because of their own failure to provide  public goods and
services. The existence of many MI schemes for health insurance have actually evolved in the context of
8IV. BASIC INSURANCE PRINCIPLES  AND MICROINSURANCE
In this section we briefly point out a few basic principles of insurance that are
important to the following  discussion of microinsurance.
Insurance and the characteristics of risk
Risks can  be  classified  along  a  number  of  dimensions: idiosyncratic (i.e.,
individual  or  household  specific)  vs.  covariate  (affecting  many  households
simultaneously),  low- vs. high-loss, single- vs. repeated events, and permutations of these
classes.  Some risks are insurable, while others are not (see Siegel and Alwang, 1999,
p.36).  The viability of insurance depends critically on the characteristics of the risk.  To
qualify for economically feasible protection from private insurance, the criteria for the
"ideal risk" should be met as far as possible.  The most important of these criteria are
that: a) the risk must be randomly and independently distributed among insured clients, b)
risks  and  losses  of  insured  clients  should  be  determinable,  measurable and  not
catastrophic, and c) the risk and loss should be not be influenced by the actions of insured
clients (e.g., no moral hazard).
"Non-ideal risks" such as drought and epidemics appear frequently and repeatedly
in many LDCs, and their existence prevents private insurance markets for these risks
from emerging. Additionally, insurance for objects (e.g. physical assets, health) is more
easily provided than is insurance for activities and flows, such as income loss. Generally,
activities and flows are more difficult to determine, measure and monitor, and there is
more potential for moral hazard. Insurance schemes must carefully examine the risks they
cover. Risk and resource pooling require continuous analysis of the risk structure and the
likelihood of  covariate and  catastrophic risk.  Claims for  losses  also  need accurate
determination,  monitoring and there is a need for administration capacity to process and
distribute indemnity  payments.
Insurance  and Risk  Transfer
Insurance is  a risk-financing transfer under which an  insurer agrees to  accept
certain financial burdens arising from losses by the insured.  It is a contractual agreement
between two parties, whereby the insurer agrees to compensate for losses (indemnity
payments as specified in the insurance contract) in return for the insured's premium
extreme government  failure in the provision of health services (ILO/PAHO, 1999;  Preker, et. al., 2001).
9payment.  Basic elements required for an insurance transaction include: a contractual
agreement, a premium payment, a benefit payment conditioned on specific circumstances
defined in the contract, and a pool of liquid financial resources held by the insurer tD
reimburse claims.
Reinsurance is a  risk-financing transfer under which the re-insurer agrees to
accept certain financial burdens arising from losses by the insurer. Typically a re-insurer
insures an insurer against extremely large losses (e.g., catastrophic losses) and draws
from a much broader risk and resource pool to be able to make such payments, when
needed.  Therefore,  most  private  re-insurers  tend  to  be  international  financial
companies.8 An important point of insurers and re-insurers is the need to interact at
different "levels" e.g., to pool risks and resources at household, community, national and
international levels.
Risk and Resource Pooling
The basic underlying principle of insurance is the sharing of risks by pooling
resources. The  pool of resources, as opposed to a pooling of risks, is a key element of the
concept of viable insurance.  Pooling of resources, especially the pooling of individuals
whose premium payments exceed the  expected value of the  loss, allows a  group to
achieve a stronger financial resource base as the group becomes larger. The strengthening
of the financial resource base is not due to the tendency of a large number of independenm
risks to cancel each other out.  This "pooling of risk" requirement is often cited as a
precondition for insurance and is based on an application of the law of large numbers
(Williams, et. al., 1985). The focus on the pooling of resources as opposed to the pooling
of risks is critical for understanding the potential and limits of MI. especially financially
sustainable MI to reach the poor.  Some MI advocates think that private insurance and
reinsurance companies seek out the poor in LDCs as potential clients in order to broaden
their risk pool, which makes the transfer of risk less costly.
Insurers and re-insurers seek means to broaden their risk pool and their resource
pools  - with  clients  whose  premium  payments  exceed  expected  losses. A  "good
insurance risk" is a client whose risks and losses are not perfectly positively correlated
18 That is, reinsurance is a means of broadening  the resource pool based on financial capacity and provides
"deep pockets" to pay claims for catastrophic losses.
10with other clients and whose expected losses do not exceed premium payments.  Adverse
selection, occurs  when  clients with  high risks  and  expected losses want  to  obtain
insurance, while those with lower risks and expected losses are more reluctant to see the
benefits of  buying  insurance. Adverse  selection and  the  issue  of  voluntary  versus
mandatory participation are important determinants of  the financial sustainability of
microinsurance  schemes.
Community-based MI schemes with poor members face the greatest threat from
their limited financial resource pool to start with." 9 Significant covariate risk, along with
catastrophic or even repeated idiosyncratic risk can deplete the community's  resource
pool and potentially bankrupt a community-based  scheme. Thus, an effective reinsurance
mechanism might  be  required  to  insure the  community-based MI  scheme  against
excessive losses. Of course such reinsurance would also incur a extra cost for insurance. 20
Pure Insurance  Premium  vs. Actual Insurance  Premium
The pure risk premium of an insurance contract is based on actuarial risk-loss
calculations.  The pure premium considers the probability of risks occuring and the
expected losses. The actual premium includes the pure premium plus the: a) transactions
costs - all costs associated with the insurance contract design and delivery, collection of
premium payments, and the assesment of losses and indemnity payments by insurers, b)
extra costs associated with uncertainty - costs that insurers often add to the pure premium
to take into account any uncertainty about the calculations used to  calculate the pure
premium, and c) profits for the insurers and reinsurers.
It is oftened claimed that "vulnerable  households are willing to pay the premiums,
but they  do  not  have  access  to  insurance,  thus  ..."  This  logic  implies  that  vulnerable
households have some demand for insurance and a corresponding "willingness-to-pay".
However, because substantial gaps exist between the pure and actual insurance premium,
there can also be wide gaps between the assumed willingness-to-pay (i.e., demand) and
real cost (i.e., supply) of insurance.  When the costs of provision of insurance to small-
19  In addition, many community-based  mutual insurance  schemes also have a limited human resource pool.
The lack of capacity  to manage an insurance mutual is also a threat to the viability of such schemes.
20 At the present time, NGOs and donors that support Ml schemes  often act as the reinsurer (either formally
or informally) in an attempt to maintain financial sustainability of the scheme. An innovation piloted by
the World Bank and ILO through the Development  Marketplace  research project is to try and institute more
formal reinsurance mechanisms to support community-based  health microinsurance.
11scale clients in an environment where information is costsly and imperfect are included in
the calculus, demand may be substantially  lower than anticipated.
Another major is issue is the "ability-to-pay" insurance premiums.  Vulnerable
households are often too poor to pay the insurance premiums, especially as lump-sun
payments.  Hence, a major focus of microinsurance has been to  identify means (i.e.,
institutional arrangements)  to lower the gap between pure and actual insurance premium 3,
and to design insurance contracts with low premiums (including subsidized premiums).
In addition, attention has  been devoted to  the means  of  collecting premiums, with
attempts to have small periodic payments spread over the year (like microfinance loan
repayments).
Another aspect of client demand, and the setting premiums and benefits, is the:r
perceptions (or misperceptions) of risks and potential losses.  Vulnerable households
often lack information about risks and expected losses, especially in this period of rapid
economic, social and political changes.  In addition, insurers often lack the ability to
accurately calculate the probabilities of risks and expected losses, resulting in a high
degree &' uncertainty for setting premiums and idemnity payments.  Transaction costs
can alsou  oe very high.  A critical public sector role can be to improve the availability of
information  about risks and losses to vulnerable households and to insurers and reinsurers
to help  -wer  the degree of uncertainty  about risks, expect  - losses, and premiums.
Micrc  esign of Insurance
The micro design of MI can empower individuals and groups to express their
needs and priorities (e.g., the types of risks and coveragc), and to manage insurance
transactions in  a manner that minimizes moral hazard, adverse selection, transaction
costs, and other problems of asymmetric information. MI can foster group management --
"triple autonomy" whereby each MI unit: (a) defines its own insurable risk; (b) organizes
financing of the insurance; and  (c)exercises control over the flow and management of its
funds (McCord,  2000). In doing so, the insurance contract introduces a complex financial
concept as an extension to familiar social interactions.  Thus, MI can bridge formal and
informal mechanisms for providing risk management instruments that are tailored to the
needs of vulnerable households and groups.
12Due to the limited depth  of the resource pool  of vulnerable  households,  most MI
programs have  covered only  a limited range of risks  and  not covered  catastrophic  losses.
In cases where they  have been more ambitious,  they have  required  subsidies  of premium
payments  andlor  external  financing  of  the  resource  pool.  Limited  coverage  results
because  of the need  for low premiums,  although  vulnerable  households  might  face high
risks  and  expected  losses.  As a result,  many  MI programs  with  limited  premiums  and
benefits  resemble  "forced"  savings  accounts  for high probability  losses.  In these  cases,
premium  payments  become  a  cash  flow  management  strategy  as  a  form  of  "pre-
payment".  But, because  of the high transactions  costs associated  with their delivery, they
are not a particularly  efficient  savings mechanism.  Interestingly,  as discussed later, in an
attempt  to bypass  regulations  of insurance  activities,  some MI programs,  especially  those
linked  to  MFIs,  have  called  their  insurance-like  product  a  "mutual  fund"  or  savings
product.  Alternatively,  in  cases that MFIs  face regulations  on  savings,  they  are calling
similar products  "insurance."
Credit,  savings  and  insurance  can  all  can  be  used,  to  some  extent,  for  risk
mitigation to provide  "insurance"  for vulnerable households  (see box).  However, "saving
up" and "saving down"  are forms of self-insurance,  and ',saving  through"  is the only type
of insurance that is formally based  on risk and resource pooling.
Saving Up, Down and Through: Savings and Insurance
Vulnerable  households  can use savings for risk management in three ways:
1)  Saving  Up: saving and building up financial assets in advance of need to
smooth consumption or meet lumpy expenditures (e.g., life-cycle  events),
2)  Saving  Down: use credit for current expenses and/or investments  and repay the
loan from future savings, and
3)  Saving  Through: contribute small amounts of savings periodically into group
resource pool to get a lump sum loan payment (e.g., ROSCAS), or similarly pay
small regular premiums for insurance  (based on risk and resource pooling)
which pays out when a covered event occurs (see Rutherford, 2000).
V. MICROFINANCE  AND MICROINSURANCE
Discussions  of microinsurance  are usually closely linked to microfinance  (Brown
and  Churchill,  2000b;  UNCDF,  2000; Brown  and  McCord,  2001).  A  strong  link exists
between  MF and MI schemes,  as the former have piloted many of the latter. Additionally,
13some MFIs have perceived a demand for increased risk management  product that can
protect both their clients' and their own interests. It is believed that MI can: 1) reduce the
negative impact of risky events on client's ability to repay loans and serve as a collateral
substitute, thereby helping existing clients and expanding coverage to riskier clients, 2)
provide an additional financial service and source of revenue for the MFI, and therefore
3) improve the financial sustainability of the MFI.  Donors and NGOS are also interested
in MI because they want to  strengthen existing MFIs, and build upon the perceived
successes of MF programs.  Also, donors and NGOs have had  an important role in
facilitating and funding many MFIs.
MI programs can learn from the experience of MF programs. 2' Credit/finance  andl
insurance markets face similar problems of information asymmetries and other sources o f
market failure so schemes that address problems such as moral hazard, adverse selection
and high transactions costs might be effective for both. MFI innovations such as group
lending and mutual enforcement have helped overcome these failures by using social
dynamics. In addition, some of the targeting and screening mechanisms used by MFIs to
target poor households and identify "good clients" can be applied to MI. 22 Links between
MFIs and  MI  extend to  institutional  and  regulatory issues, issues of  financial and
economic sustainability, and potential for social inclusion and exclusion embodied in
MF/4MI  design.
Microfinance programs have proliferated in recent years and have emerged as
important actors in the SRM equation.  Some of the best know of such programs include
the Grameen Bank in  Bangladesh, the  Bank Rakyat of  Indonesia, and BancoSol in
Bolivia (Morduch, 1999; Morduch and Sharma, 2001).  Numerous community banks
have  also  emerged,  particularly  in  Latin  America.  These  programs  strengthen
households' risk management by providing credit to finance new economic activities anc
adopt new technologies  to help raise incomes, and use group dynamics to improve access
and lower the costs of this credit.
21 Note, however, that alternative (i.e., non-MFI  providers) delivery mechanisms are possible: MI
institutions might be formed independently  while exploiting the desirable design features of MFIs and
existing  networks.
22 Screening  improves targeting efficiency (e.g., in terms of high repayment  rates), but it has been
associated with exclusion or bias against poorer households or those not belonging to a specific group or
association -thereby decresing the targeting equity.
14In  some  cases,  MFIs mobilize  savings, providing households with  fungible
financial reserves that can be used to smooth consumption.  As incomes grow, households
are better equipped to manage risk through precautionary savings, asset diversification,
and short-term borrowing.  However, in many cases, regulatory restrictions that prevent
MFIs from providing savings and thereby restrict the use of savings as a means of risk
management.  This  is  one reason that there  has been interest by  MFIs to  consider
insurance as  an  alternative risk  management instrument.  However, efforts  toward
financial reforms to allow MFIs to provide savings products might be more appropriate.
MFIs are also interested in insurance because microfinance schemes - as often
structured - can increase vulnerability  of clients via risks of loan default, especially when
it ties households into rigid repayment schedules. Risky events can threaten timely loan
repayment. Households, rather than suffer social sanctions  from default, tend to resort to
"bad" coping practices that increase their vulnerability to future losses.  Provision of
insurance might strengthen and broaden participation in MFI schemes by vulnerable
households by increasing their creditworthiness. Alternatives exist here as well.  For
instance, better risk management might be attained through flexible repayment schemes
for loans. Evaluation of MI desirability must include examination of these options.
Examples of an MFI providing an insurance product that meets its own and its
clients needs simultaneously are "life insurance" and "property insurance", which when
offered, are usually mandatory conditions for receiving loans (Brown and Churchill,
.2000). Life insurance is offered by some MFIs, but is often really loan insurance in the
event of death, since it guarantees that if the client dies his or her outstanding debts will
be repaid, with or without any survivor benefits.  In some cases MFIs offer property
insurance, but it usually only repays the outstanding balance of a loan used to purchase
the insured asset - and not the replacement value or any income losses.  In both of these
cases, the MI benefits both the client and the MFI, although it might be argued that the
MFI is the main beneficiary - since households might still be left vulnerable with respect
to their future income eaming and risk management potential. 23
23 A possible problem with linking microinsurance  to microfinance  loans occurs if a borrower decides not
to borrow during a certain period. What happens  to their insurance coverage?
15Microinsurance is potentially a much more complicated financial instrument than
microfinance.  Brown (2000, p.1) notes:  "More  so than credit  or savings, offering
insurance is  an inherently risky business (pardon the pun). In order for an insurance
scheme to be sustainable, its managers have to be able to predict the future - setting
prices for insurance products requires calculations of how many clients will die in the
next year (life insurance) or  the value of  assets  lost,  stolen or destroyed (property
insurance or the cost of annual medical treatment (health insurance) - and be reasonably
accurate on a consistent basis. If these predictions prove to be inaccurate, unexpectedly
high insurance claims can quickly decapitalize an institution."  Microinsurance is also
more prone to corruption and mismanagement  because of the nature of insurance - where
premiums are collected and held in reserve for future payments.  In fact, the history of
MFIs offering microinsurance  has not been promising (Brown and McCord, 2000).24
Some micro insurance examples
Examples of MI are harder to find than MFIs as the former are relatively new
innovations 25. The most prominent forms of MI are health insurance and life insurance
programs. To date, micro health insurance programs have usually been carried out as part
of an overall "health care package" that links the health insurance to a health facility. The
ILO, Grameen Bank, SEWA (see below), FINCA (all MFIs), for example, all have health
insurance programs linked to health providers.  In many cases, insurance is only offered
to participants in their MFI programs.  Results from the few empirical studies so far are
mixed, showing that poor people can organize insurance schemes, but that it is difficult to
include the poorest of the poor in them.  High opportunity costs of time, active exclusion
by wealthier participants, and problems of adverse selection are some of the factors
behind the difficulties in integrating the poorest of the poor into MI programs (Juetting,
2000).  Furthermore evidence to  date  indicates that  many  MI  health  schemes are
dependent on outside financing and subsidies (Baeza, 2000)26.
24 According  to Brown  (2000,  p.1):  "...  for every  successful  example  of a microinsurance  product  (linked  to
MFls}  there  are several  examples  of spectacular  failures  that  often  leave  clients  without  an protection
(despite  having  paid  their  premiums)  and the  providing  institution  bankrupt."
25A compendium  of microinsurance  schemes  was  prepared  by the ILO,  see Lee  (1999). See ILO/PAHO
for  a review  of micro  health  insurance  schemes  n Latin  America  and  the Caribbean.
26 In a review  of MI schemes  in  Latin  America  associated  with  the ILO's  STEP  global  program,  Baeza
(2000)  found  that  all were  dependent  on subsidies  and almost  all were  dependent  on extemal  financing.
16Examples  of  MFI-related  MI  life  insurance  programs  include  FINCA
International (Uganda, Tanzania and Malawi), Delta Life Insurance (Bangladesh), and
Card Bank in the Philippines (UNCDF, 2000).  In India, the Self-Employed Women's
Association (SEWA) began as a result of the absence of life insurance for women in the
informal sector (Hauch, 1997). This absence was due to:1) doubt that poor women could
pay premiums (formal sector life insurance is  based on 50-50% employee-employer
contribution), 2)  difficulty in  collecting premiums due to irregular cash flows in  the
infornal  sector, and 3) poor women are considered a high risk because of their living
conditions. SEWA originally  joined forces with the public sector insurance company and
lobbied for government matching contributions. SEWA then had a  special insurance
department linked to their banking services. Recently they have considered setting up an
independent insurance  cooperative.  The  SEWA "insurance package,"  includes life
insurance for the member, health insurance, asset insurance (for housing and equipment)
in case of riots,  floods, fire, and insurance for accidental death or disability.  It now
boasts membership of more than 20,000 people.  The program faces many challenges,
such as an ongoing debate about mandatory vs. voluntary participation by members, and
about means of financing premiums.  There has been a recent move toward voluntary
participation  and use of annual premium payments for year-to-year  coverage and interest
from fixed savings accounts at the SEWA bank to finance premiums. SEWA insurance is
subsidized, and  without the active financial support from the Indian Government and
German Technical Cooperation, SEWA's financial viability is questionable (Juetting,
2000).
VI. MICROINSURANCE  ISSUES
The demand for, supply of, and institutional arrangements  for microinsurance are
all critical determinants of MI viability. As emphasized in this paper, there is an assumed
logic that poor households and those in the informal economy have some unmet demand
for insurance because they: 1) face many risks, 2) are excluded from most formal types of
insurance, and 3) traditional informal risk management arrangements and formal safety
nets are being threatened or are incapable of managing short-term risk in an efficient
manner.  However,  understanding  of  poor  households'  needs,  preferences  and
expectations  with respect to the demand for MI has been limited by a small research base
17(Brown and McCord, 2001).  The demand for MI is also a function of the availability of
alternative risk management options.  Much of the existing literature on microinsurance,
focuses attention on supply and institutional issues - the design and delivery of MI.  For
this  reason,  we  also  chose  to  focus  on  design  and  delivery  issues.  This  supply-
institutional focus is only a partial picture, and it helps highlight a critical gap in the
assessment of MI as an SRM instrument.
Type of risk and alternative risk management strategies
A critical message from the SRM framework is that risk management should be
treated within a holistic framework that recognizes multiple sources of risk and suitable
risk  management options for these different sources.  Microinsurance is best able to
address idiosyncratic, low loss events, and the financial viability of the MI may be
enhanced if it covers single-event types of risk.  Alternative SRM measures to address
idiosyncratic risks and  low  loss events include preventative measures, strengthening
informal arrangements, more flexible credit and  savings products  from MFIs.  The
poorest of  the poor,  however, usually only  have access only  the weakest forms of
informal risk  management arrangements, and  might  not  be  members  of  groups or
associations.  They, thus, might be  excluded from many of these risk  management
alternatives. The people who are most vulnerable to risks covered by MI may also be
those who are most likely to be excluded from participation in MI.  Furthermore, the
poorest of  the poor  often lack human and  property rights, which  exacerbates their
exclusion from formal RM options.
Covariate  and high-loss forms of risks are best managed through emergency loans
and formal safety nets.  MI products might not be easily suited to  help households
manage covariate and high-loss forms of risk, but there still is scope to consider how they
might be designed in an appropriate manner to  do so. 27 In reality, many vulnerable
households are most averse to covariate and high-loss forms of risk, and they often adopt
inefficient behaviors (e.g., "safety-first" practices in agriculture to assure food security.
27 An innovative insurance instrument under consideration  for dealing with covariate and high-loss risks are
"index based insurance" products (Skees, et. al., 1999). The basic principle of index based insuarance is to
insure against the source of risks as opposed to insuring against the economic losses themseleves - with
objective and transparent events acting as "triggers". Index-based insurance products can lower transaction
costs, and eliminate problems associated with moral hazard and adverse selection. At the present time,
there is a World Bank Development  Marketplace pilot study where weather based index insurance is being
18see Siegel and Alwang, p.15-16) that lead to lower expected incomes. As a consequence,
they tend to adopt destructive  coping strategies when the risky event is realized. In either
case, the outcome can lead to increased household vulnerability over time.
Program design  for microinsurance
The design of MI programs is a  critical determinant of their success. Design
affects the ability to overcome information asymmetries and reduce transactions costs;
these factors determine, to a large extent,  the financial viability of such programs.  To
date, the types of risks and services provided by microinsurers have mainly been limited
to  minimal health  insurance coverage  and  small-scale death  payments.  However,
identification of risks and coverage of services is only one part of the overall program
design. For example, multiple delivery models exist, even in the case of health insurance.
Other  design  issues  include:  premium  amount,  eligibility  and  degree  of
inclusion/exclusion of  potential  clients,  specific  coverage  (triggers  for  indemnity,
indemnity amount), rules  for  claimants,  use  of  copayments (in  the  case  of  health
insurance)  and  other  mechanisms  to  minimize  moral  hazard.  Premium  collection
mechanisms are another important  design issue. Arrangements for pooling and transfer of
risk - within the insured group, and/or outside the group to  insurers and re-insurers
become critical. Trade-offs exist as well - for example, there is a clear trade-off between
the cost of premiums, the value of benefits and the depth and spread of coverage.
Design of MI also has implications on the demand for insurance. McCord (2000a)
found serious weaknesses in  "the insurance culture" in  LDCs, as misunderstandings
about premiums, levels of coverage, and indemnity payments persist.  Levels of coverage
and low premium payments interact with the lack of "insurance culture." For example, in
the case of micro health insurance, because coverage is often limited and premiums are
low, MI participants treat the program as a type of prepayment of normal health fees.
They often feel cheated if they do not recover their premiums as indemnities, and the
most important determinant of financial success-the  pooling of risks and resources-is
lost.  Inadequate skills and knowledge among potential insurance providers and among
government regulators compound  this lack of insurance culture.
considered as a type of crop insurance.
19Delivery  of microinsurance
Several health insurance delivery models have been piloted in developing-country
contexts (McCord, 2001; Brown and McCord, 2000).  A major focus of the different
delivery models has been to deal with the question: How can we lower the transaction
costs and costs associated with asymmetric information?  However, more attention is
currently being devoted to the critical question: Who bears the financial risks of the
insurance contract?
In  the partner-agent  model,  insurers,  health  care  providers  and  MFIs work
together to bundle an insurance-health care package. In this case, the insurers assume
financial risks and  the  MFI  serves as  a  "matchmaker" to  provide lower-cost links
between the other parties.  FINCA-Uganda is an example of the partner-agent model,
whereby the MFI helped forge alliances with formal-sector insurance and health care
providers (see Annex 3).  An alternative example of the partner-agent model is the
Friends of Women's  World Banking in  India where the MFI served as an umbrella
organization for smaller MFIs.  The umbrella function helped broaden the risk/finance
pool.  In a community-based insurance model policyholders are owners and managers of
all aspects of insurance operations; presumably ownership helps monitor moral hazard
and reduces transactions costs. The community assumes financial risk, unless it is able to
transfer some of the risk to other communities,  formal insurers or reinsurers. CARD Bank
in the Philippines recently converted its life insurance program into a  Mutual Benefih
Association, a version of a community-based (mutual) model.  The full-service model is
similar  to  formal  sector  insurance  provision,  whereby  the  MFI  as  the  insurer  is
responsible for managing and financing all insurance operations, and assumes financial
risks.  An  example of  the  full-service model  is  SEWA;  another is  the  Canadian
Cooperative Association's program (UJNCDF,  2000).  The final management example is
the provider model, where the health care provider and insurer are the same party, with
insurance coverage limited to  services available from the health care provider.  The
insurance provider assumes financial risks.  This model is similar in many aspects to the
HMOs widely found in the United States. 28
28 Health Maintenance  Organizations (HMOs) are a relatively new innovation in managed health care.
They are a form of insurance that integrates health service providers and insurance firms. An HMO is a
20These four models have shown varying degrees of success but several problems
shared by all (McCord, 2000; Brown and McCord, 2000).  Some models had incentives
for preventive care, while others  did not.  While some  of the examples had  limited
coverage, which was generally recognized as the price to be paid for low premiums.
LDC clients, particularly the poor, were found to be sensitive to premium price and
payment schedules, and even with low premiums, regular collection of premiums was a
problem.  Low premiums, by necessity, limit coverage, so that an important type of
insurance-catastrophic  coverage-is  lost.  Coverage for large-scale covariate risks -
especially in community-based schemes - is impossible without substantial deepening of
the risk and resource pool.  More attention needs to be devoted to alternative means of
expanding the risk and resource pools of community-based  MI programs. Expansion can
be achieved by grouping communities or through formal insurers or reinsurers. Many of
the MI schemes that required an active role from MFIs or were community-based  placed
additional  management  burdens  on  institutions  and  organizations lacking  specific
insurance skills, were prone to fraud, and few achieved financial sustainability. 29
McCord (2000a), McCord and Brown (2000) and Brown, et. al. (2000) conclude
that there is no single optimal health insurance model.  The appropriate model depends
on the availability of local health care services, the existence of insurance companies
willing to service the poor and informal sectors, and the existence of institutions (e.g.,
MFIs) or associations (e.g., SEWA) to partner with or serve as links between health care
providers,  insurers,  and  clients.  They  do  emphasize,  however,  that  despite  the
desirability of exploiting linkages between parties and agents, it is important to have a
separate entity provide the insurance - to protect clients and groups of clients (including
MFIs) from bearing financial risk and because of the need for specialized insurance
capacity and financial reserves that insurers and re-insurers can provide.
group of physician-providers  that carefully screen procedures, encourage lower-cost  care, and conduct
negotiations  with alternative service providers, including  hospitals. They generally self-insure patient-
members and rely on reinsurance markets for catastrophic health insurance. HMOs have lowered health
care cost growth in the US through reductions in quantities of services ("managed  care") and in prices
(through market power and negotiations). Most of the savings have come through lower unit prices. The
spread of HMOs has had spillover effects in non-managed  care markets due to their impact on reducing the
demand for non-member physician services. However, as insurance-health  service entities, they have
enjoyed some success.
29 This in contrast  to partner-agent models where many of these problems do not arise because of the
division-of-labor  between the MFI and insurer.
21Studies in  Africa  show  mixed results on  the  effectiveness of  mutual health
organizations. 30 Better-organized groups tend to succeed, 3' but the design of the service
package is a key determinant of success. For instance, organizations with direct links to
health care providers and those that match premium amounts with indemnity payments
have been the most successful.  Fee structure is an important determinant of success and
participants desire fees that reflect relative risks; these can be person- specific (CIDEF,
1998).
The SEWA program faces several design issues including the types of insurance
provided, participation requirements, and  premium rates.  SEWA members initially
demanded multiple insurance products to mitigate different risk and flexibility in paying
premiums.  The provision of a variety of insurance products by SEWA has led to high
absolute numbers of participants, but there are problems associated with loss claims and1
coverage. 32 And participation rates have declined over time in many cases.  Participants
complain about the length and contentiousness of the indemnity payment process, and
also are displeased with the limited coverage (e.g. transport costs to health clinics are not
paid, but represent a large portion of out-of-pocket  health-care costs).
Much of the emphasis on using MFIs as insurance providers comes from a desire
to exploit their advantages in dealing with market failures and information asymmetries.
and to utilize existing networks.  For instance, social networks are used by MFIs as a
means of "social control" to avoid abuses and problems associated with moral hazard and
adverse selection.  Some forms of  social control can be  easily adapted to  assist MI
programs.  Using local or group knowledge may effectively enhance the selection of
insurance participants and minimize adverse selection.  However, social exclusion can
result from  these processes:  there is  a  tradeoff between  use  of  social control for
screening "legitimate" cases of moral hazard and use to exclude undesirable groups. Peer
pressure may be used, perhaps jointly with group education, to lower moral hazard. Peer
30 Wiesmann and Juetting (2000) review "health  mutuals" in Sub-Saharan  Africa and higlight the
inadequate analysis of their impact in terms of meeting the poor's demand for risk management.
3i "Success" is a relative term in these studies. The indicator of success is usually the sustainability of the
MI scheme and not its financial sustainability (without subsidies  and external financing),  or the extent of
coverage to poor households.
32 SEWA offers several types of insurance,  but coverage tends to be limited. Health insurance, for example,
only covers a person that is hospitalized for more than 24 hours. With about 270,000 members, about 10%
participate in the various insurance schemes.
22pressure may also facilitate  premium collection. However, group enforcement, one of the
mainstays of high loan repayment rates among MFIs does not directly transfer to MI.
Group enforcement practices may be useful in settling claims (a group council may be
used to determine whether, for instance, an illness qualifies for insurance indemnity) but
such  a  process may increase transactions costs to  unacceptable levels.  The group
enforcement in MFIs works because loan default is a discrete, measurable, and infrequent
event.  For health insurance, in particular, determining and verifying losses is not  so
straightforward.
Financial sustainability  and actuarial soundness of microinsurance
One  of  the  key  MI  design  issues  is  whether  screening  and  enforcement
mechanisms used by MFIs are also appropriate to help ensure the financial sustainability
of an MI scheme.  In such cases, the bundling of MI within MFI programs may make
sense. Evidence shows that MFIs, because of the high transactions costs, frequently need
donor subsidies in order to survive.  Others are forced to charge "high" interest rates to
cover costs and these higher rates ration credit away from the poorest households. In the
case of MIs, less attention has been devoted to the tradeoff between using the "micro"
component to reduce costs and how that impacts the extension of coverage to poorer
households.
Economies of administration may favor the bundling of finance and MI packages.
A major unknown factor is the relationship between the size of the operation (in terms of
membership) and  its  financial viability.  While there  are clearly  some fixed  costs
associated with MI provision, it is not clear how these costs stack up against variable
costs.  Size may, however, affect ability of groups and associations to lobby for public
support.  For example, because of the  size of  its  membership, SEWA was able to
negotiate with formal insurance providers and obtain government financial support (along
with donor financial and technical support).
As  more MI  schemes are piloted  covering different types  of  risk  and  new
populations, more information is needed on the risk structure, on transactions costs of
monitoring and enforcement, and on other management costs.  These costs are largely
unknown a priori.  Often, transactions costs of monitoring and enforcement of  MFI
contracts are lowered by shifting some of these costs to participants  through, for example,
23requiring participation in regular meetings or regular visits to  program offices.  Both
actual and opportunity costs are components of the social cost of the MI program and
cannot be ignored, especially when trying to justify MI from an economic rather than
financial sustainability perspective.
Measuring the "success" of MI programs is complicated and should not be limited
to  indicators  of  financial (or institutional) sustainability 33. To  date,  reviews  of MI
programs tend to focus on financial sustainability and not on how the MI programs affect
household vulnerability. An example is a community-based health MI scheme in Senegal
where only hospitalization is covered and premiums are set quite low.  There is evidence
that members pay one-third less for hospitalization and recover three weeks earlier from
illnesses as a result of the insurance scheme (Juetting and Tine, 2000).  This type of a
client-based measure of success - which can result in lower household vulnerability -
should be no less important than measures of the institutional sustainability.  From a
SRM-perspective client welfare should clearly be  given more attention - albeit such
information  is more costly to collect and analyze.
Sophisticated  contractual  arrangements  often  substitute  for  public  and  private  sector
failures
These arrangements include contracts between service providers and clients such
as descriptions of  coverage, triggers, indemnnity  provisions and  limits,  fee structure,
dispute resolution, etc. They also include explicit or implicit contracts between providers
and financiers, and between govermment  and providers.  Contracts between provider and
clients are generally accompanied by self-enforcement mechanisms that exploit social
control,  but  they  E  c:)  place  new  cognitive  burdens  on  participants  in  terms  of
understanding  the potential benefits and costs of insurance. Holzmann (2001) notes that
SRM can only succeed if it improves the "financial literacy" of the vulnerable. Part o^
this  improvement may come through practice  - including pilot projects - and  it is
important to point out that financial literacy (like changing the "insurance culture") may
be a necessary precondition for the success of MI.
33 In most cases, financial sustainability has been investigated. In other cases more attention has been
placed on whether the institutional structure of the MI scheme was sustainable - even if it required
siEtrficant subsidies and financial infusions. This is because some donors and NGOS seem to be more
interested in sustainable MI programs.
24Insurance is a different business than credit and savings and requires entirely
different skills and institutional capacity.  This capacity is frequently lacking in LDCs,
both  among demanders of  insurance products and their  potential suppliers.  Just  as
individuals lack "insurance culture," few MFIs or NGOs in LDCs possess the human
resources necessary to undertake insurance operations.  In addition, many MFIs are still
in the beginning stage of operation and would be hard pressed to extend their operations
beyond their core products.
Regulation  of MI Industry
A  major objective of  SRM is to  strengthen legal  protections for vulnerable
households, and such protections need to be in place if MI is to be used to cover a wider
range of risks than health  and loss of life.  Legal protections such as  recourse for
indemnity judgments, protection against fraud, etc., require strengthening of the legal
system and effective regulation of the insurance industry. Insurance is one of the most
heavily regulated industries in the developed world.  In LDCs, regulatory institutions are
non-existent or weak, yet regulation is necessary for efficient functioning of the industry.
A successful MI industry requires capacity to regulate and the will to implement and
enforce regulations, yet  few resources are currently being  devoted to  this  capacity
building.  There is a clear public role in providing guidelines for MI, and the guidelines
should include bonding and financial guarantees, guidelines for investments of premiums,
dispute resolution, etc.  These guidelines build the financial viability of the industry and
the confidence of  participants.  Such confidence may help overcome the "insurance
culture" bias.
An important issue for donors and NGOS and other proponents of MI is how to
build regulatory capacity and evaluate tradeoffs between resources destined to build such
capacity and resources for the MI programs themselves.  Governments need to promote
the process of regulatory capacity building.  The "micro" in microinsurance does not
eliminate the need for regulation.
In the absence of an appropriate regulatory framework for microinsurance, there
have been some attempts to  use pre-payments (e.g., a  form of savings) to mask the
insurance product so it is not subject to insurance regulations (Brown, et. al., 2000).
There is a need for more attention to advocating financial and insurance reforms and
25regulations that  help  improve  access  to  multiple  risk  management instruments by
vulnerable households.
Microinsurance  as part of a holistic risk management strategy
Microinsurance costs should be compared to alternative risk management optio11s
at different levels.  Investments in certain public goods (sanitation, inmmunization,  etc.)
provide alternative forms of risk management (usually by reducing risks or exposure to
them), and the cost of each (public good investment versus MI) should be compared. MI
should not  substitute for other investments in  public goods.  As  MI resources can
possibly crowd out other investments in,  say, health infrastructure, this crowding out
must  be considered part of the overall program cost.  Microinsurance provides risk
mitigation, but investments in risk reduction or formal coping strategies (e.g., safety nets
such as public works programs or food/cash  transfers) might be preferred. Risk reduction
might be  achieved by investments in  sanitation or  disease immunization programs at
lower cost than health insurance. For budget-constrained governments it is often less
costly to  let donors and NGOS finance MI schemes than to invest their own scarce
resources in risk reduction.
Options also  exist for  self-insurance using  financial assets (or  even physical
assets) for self-insurance.  Saving using financial assets and other forms self-insurance
can have additional risk management  benefits,  in  that, they might be  more easily
accessible for timely use (as compared to insurance, which might require pre-approvals
and filings of claims, etc.)  It is possible that financial sector reforms and investments in
infrastructure to improve market access may be a more cost-effective means of reducing
vulnerability than MI.  Financial reforms and  investments in  infrastructure can have
additional benefits for the management of a variety of risks, and they are critical for
increasing opportunities for increasing household income - all of which can help reduce
household vulnerability.
In many cases, the motivation for provision of health insurance  is provided by
failure of the public sector to provide health care  at a reasonable cost (Preker, et. al.,
2001).  Mutual health  organizations, for  example, provide members with  improved
"access to good quality health care through their own contributions and by a range of
26financing mechanisms mainly involving insurance, but which also may include simple
pre-payments, savings and soft loans, third party subscription payments, etc." (Juetting,
2000)  The organizations are systems of voluntary "insurance" based on mutual aid and
sharing  of  risks-  through  well  established social  networks- with  members usually
participating in management and operation.  They focus on the "health care package",
with "insurance" being part of the financing mechanism (Juetting, 2000).  The insurance
contract can not be expected to substitute for access to quality health care.  In fact, a
recent review of MI programs in Latin America and the Caribbean concludes that most
MI programs for health insurance "do not engage in risk management and are primarily
designed to increase access to health care for population groups who lack access to health
services due to low income or other social reasons (PAHO/ILO, 1999, p.3 39)."
VII.  CONCLUSION
Microinsurance  is one instrument in the SRM toolbox, but its effectiveness is less
clearly established than that of microfinance and other SRM practices.  Information on
MI is still widely lacking.  SRM practitioners need to understand  the potential role of MI
in managing risk.  Questions not yet addressed in depth include the roles of the public
and private sectors in promoting MI, the appropriate role of donors and NGOS, the best
institutional and regulatory environment, and, especially, the impact of MI on household
behavior, and how MI affects other household risk management actions in reducing
vulnerability over time.
A need exists for thorough evaluation of existing MI programs, examination of
access to such programs by vulnerable households and groups, and analysis of impacts of
MI on participants. Such studies should also consider how MI affects risk management
practices at other institutional levels and whether it is the best SRM tool for conditions in
a given situation. Potential complementarities  between MI and other formal and informal
risk management  practices - at different levels  - must be identified.
Microinsurance is a substitute solution for the vulnerable when markets and the
state fail to provide efficient risk management  alternatives.  Other market failures may
exist that are even more constraining to the goal of reducing vulnerability and poverty.
The  vulnerable face  multiple  constraints  to  efficient  risk  management,  and  lack
opportunities to increase their incomes. Although MI might improve welfare, unless it is
27part of a  comprehensive risk management strategy, its likely impact on reduction of
household vulnerability is likely to be marginal.  Furthermore, considerable gaps exist
between the demand for, and supply of, insurance to the poor. Appropriate institutions
and organizations are often absent along with a lack of capacity to bridge these gaps.
Logic indicates that the vulnerable might demand insurance, but the costs of such
services can be high.  Demand-side constraints include the lack of a formal "insurance
culture,"  risk  perceptions  and  attitudes,  and  the  lack  of  trust  in  insurance-type
arrangement so LDC clients are unsure about paying in advance for a service that they
may or may not receive in the future.  Some evidence shows that clients do not find it
socially acceptable to "bet" on negative events occurring.  These problems contrast MI
with  financial  services, where  the  benefits  of  credit  and  savings  are  more  easily
perceived. Financial services also challenge fewer social and cultural taboos.
The supply side of the insurance equation is also problematic, but design and
delivery issues have been the main focus of microinsurance, to  date.  Private sector
providers of insurance and reinsurance have not met the demand, mainly because of
information asymmetries  and imperfect markets. Supply side issues include the design of
the program and its delivery, the regulatory environment for finance and insurance, and
tradeoffs between MI provision and other forms of risk management.  More attention
needs  to  be  devoted  to  identify  risk  management  instruments that  address  more
pernicious forms of risk such as covariate and high-loss risks.  These risks can probably
only be addressed in an insurance framework using insurance (not micro) and reinsurance
that broaden the risk and resource pool.  For some of these risky events, formal safety
nets (including transfers), along with emergency loans and savings might be preferred. In
all cases, there are tradeoffs between formal insurance products, savings, and forrmal
safety nets.
Because MI can crowd out informal insurance and coping (formal and informnal)
strategies, the key question becomes whether, through this crowding out, will MI actuallv
strengthen household risk management  capacity.  And will, as a result of access to MI,
households be better able to deal with other non-insured risks?
28Some lessons  for design of microinsurance
As the SRM framework stresses the importance of moving toward proactive risk
management, a clear and logical opening exists for MI-type products. Micoinsurance is a
hybrid  between  informal,  unregulated risk  coping  and  formal,  regulated products.
Ultimately, the design of these products will determine their viability and effectiveness in
reducing vulnerability.  The limited empirical evidence on MI experience does suggest
some important conditions for success:
. Simplicity  of  the  insurance  instrument  should be  assured through  contract
standardization. Lower  premiums will increase participation, but  transactions
costs discourage it.
*  Transactions costs can be lowered through cost-minimizing  monitoring systems
and  efficient  incentive schemes.  These  schemes should make  use  of  and
contribute to social capital.
*  Affordability and transparency about benefits/payments are necessary.  Flexible
payment schedules may improve participation.
*  The MI provider needs to be located close to client base to obtain information,
build confidence,  and be receptive to participant needs.
*  Microinsurance is often a group enterprise and financial literacy can be facilitated
through group involvement in management decisions.
These lessons provide suggestions about the critical role of the government in
promoting efficient SRM through MI:
*  Provide information  about the viability of and alternatives  to MI.
*  Assisting communities in organizing groups and institutions.
. Provide  appropriate regulatory  framework for insurance and  reinsurance, but
allow for voluntary affiliation and bottoms-up design to fit specific conditions.
•  Provide political, technical and financial support for micro-insurance.
*  Promote "financial literacy" through education.
The main message of this paper is one of cautious optimism.  There is some
potential for efficient and equitable risk management through microinsurance.  But, we
still lack sufficient information  to determine the magnitude of the promise. It is clear that
MI may be an acceptable means of managing some forms of risk, but not all. We must
29also consider the  impacts of microinsurance and  other risk  management options on
household vulnerability.  The appropriate type of MI for a given place will be highly
dependent on local conditions, so that there will be a need for case-by-case assessments.
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34ANNEX  1:
Instruments Available  for Rural Households to Manage Risk
Micro  Meso  Macro
Household  Level  Community  Level  Extra-Community  Level
Risk  Reduction
Investment  to protect,  Investments  in  physical  Infornation  on  risk and  risk
maintain  and enhance  assets  and social  infrastructure  reduction
Adopt  new technology  Social  ties and  network  Rules  and  regulations
Adjust  asset  portfolio  and  Participation  in  Guaranteed  rights  and
income-generating  activities  community  institutions  security
Permanent  migration  and decision-making  Stable  macro-economy,
Rules  and  regulations  policy  regime,  and  political
Rights  and  security  system
Open  and  free  markets
Responsive  institutions
Investments  in public  goods,
physical  and  social
infrastructure
Risk Mitigation
Asset  portfolio  Adjust  asset  portfolio  and  Markets  for  household  Markets  for  household  assets
Management  income-generating  activities  assets  Market  information
Hold  financial  or non-  Physical  and  social  Investments  in physical  and
financial  assets  (e.g.,  infrastructure  social  infrastructure
livestock,  food  stocks,
jewelry)  for precautionary
savings
Seasonal  migration
Insurance  Formal  insurance  Informnal  insurance  based  Formal  insurance,  private  and
Informal  insurance  based  on  on community  social  public  sector,  and
intra-household  social  capital  capital  claims  international  organizations
claims  Formal  community  (e.g.,  crop  insurance,  health
Microinsurance  that  links  insurance  pooling  insurance)
informal-formal  mechanisms  associations  Disaster  aid funds
Inter-linked  contracts
Finance  Formal  and informal  credit  Community  credit  unions  Financial  systems,  national
Inter-linked  contracts  and savings  clubs,  and  and  international
"banks"  for  other  asset  Inter-community  credit
stocks  associations  and  "banks"  for
other  stocks
Risk Coping
Draw  down  assets  (e.g.,  skip  Draw  down  community  Targeted  safety  nets
meals,  mine  soil,  not  pay  assets  (e.g., reduce  (transfers,  public  works)
school  fees)  maintenance,  harvest  or  Social  investment  projects
Use  underemployed  assets  mine  natural  resources)  (e.g.,  social  funds)
(e.g.,  off-farm  employment,  Depend  on charity  or aid  Depend  on charity  or aid from
child  labor)  from  outside  community  national  or international
Sell assets  organizations
Encroach  on  assets  of others  Intemational  food  aid
Illegal  activities  Donor  assistance
Formal  and  informal  credit
_ Depend  on charity  l
Source:  Siegel  and Alwang  (1999).
35ANNEX 2:
Vulnerability  - An Example of The "Risk Chain"
Consider a simplified example of the vulnerability "risk chain" and options for risk management
at different levels. This example, although simplified, remains quite complicated. The risk chain
represents a  continuum, with multiple possible actions by different  institutional actors, with
consequences for risk-response-outcome sets faced by other levels.  Many actions have longer-
term implications for asset accumulation and depletion and subsequent risk-response-outcomes.
The example is of health risks related to mosquito-born  malaria.
Risk: malaria-carrying mosquitoes.
Response:  actions that can be taken ex ante and ex post.  Options for responses to mosquito-
bome malaria will depend on numerous factors, notably the household and community asset base.
What car!  be done ex ante to reduce  the risk of getting malaria?
I .Eliminate mosquitoes that are carriers of malaria or destroy their breeding grounds.
Household level: apply insecticides, remove  standing water, and  improve water and
sanitation treatment.  These risk reduction measures have limited effectiveness, partly
due to extemalities associated  with individual actions.
Community level: like household level, but group action is potentially more effectivz
due to intemalization of externalities.
Regional and national level:  provide information about the risk and means of addressing
the problem. Organize and finance an information or spraying campaign.
International level: like regional and national level, provide knowledge and funding.
Note also that international  policies such as banning insecticides may affect the ability at
lower levels to reduce the risk.
2. Reduce exposure (or  susceptibility) to mosquito-borne malaria.  An individual's  exposure
depends on factors such as the broadly defined asset base. Existing health and nutritional status
physical assets such as housing, infrastructure and household location all determine exposure to
risk.
Household level: take malaria pills, use netting, coils, etc.  Altematively, household can
migrate to upland or drier areas to reduce exposure.
Community level: build infrastructure for pill distribution;  provide information.
Regional and national level: info campaign to encourage use of malaria pills, mosquito
netting, etc.  Subsidize household and community actions.
International level: like regional and national level.
36What can be done ex ante to mitigate the welfare losses of getting malaria?
Take actions to mitigate the negative impacts associated with getting malaria.  Risk mitigation
can provide compensation for welfare losses (e.g., income losses) associated with getting malaria.
Household  level:  obtain  health  insurance that  includes  malaria  treatment,  obtain
insurance against employment loss due to malaria, hold savings to cover income losses,
cultivate social capital for assistance, teach children to help in household chores and
employment in case breadwinner gets malaria or household members need to provide
care.
Community level: social assistance based on "social contract" to help malaria-afflicted
household; build and support health clinic.
Regional and  national  level: provide  legal and  institutional framework to  support
household mitigation actions (e.g., finance and insurance institutions).
International level: provide international finance and  insurance services to  provide
compensation for malaria related income losses.
What can be done ex post to cope with the welfare  losses after getting malaria?
Take actions to cope with the negative impacts associated with actually getting malaria.  Risk
coping can provide compensation for welfare losses (e.g., income losses) associated with getting
malaria
Household  level:  purchase  anti-malaria medicine  and  treatments. Home  rest  and
assistance from household members; have other household members work extra (remove
children from school); after recovery from illness, increase work effort to replenish lost
income; possible asset sales to maintain consumption levels.
Community level: ad hoc social assistance for health related costs and income loss.
Regional and national  level: social assistance for health-related costs and income loss.
International level: social assistance for health-related  costs and income loss.
Outcome: expected household income loss relative to a threshold over a specified  period. Shorter
term: What is income loss resulting from illness, out-of-pocket expenses. Longer term: What are
the dynamics?  How will response impact household assets and risk-exposure-response-outcome
in future.
37ANNEX 3:
An Example of The Partner-Agent Model 34
Motivation of Different Parties
MFI:
*  reduce  vulnerability from health and  accidental death risks  (that reduce  income
and/or increase expenditures) faced by clients to improve  their ability to repay loans
*  provide an additional benefit to clients at no extra risk to the MFI, with a minimal
administrative  burden  since  MFI  only  collects  insurance  premiums  (all  other
insurance functions,  eg contract, indemnity  payments done by insurer)
Insurer
*  efficient (i.e., low cost) access to an untapped market
*  potential profits from new client base
Hospital
*  guaranteed payment for services provided
*  new paying clients
Clients
*  reduce vulnerability from health  and  accidental death risks  (that reduce income
and/or increase expenditures) to improve their ability to repay loans
*  better family health
*  assurance that family does not bear responsibility for unpaid loans in case of death
NOTES:
1. The  insurer is  responsible for  insurance contracts that  specify risks  covered, premiums,
benefits, claims and indemnity  payments. And bears risks.
2. The MFI acts only as an "agent" for the insurer, linking its client to the insurer. It does not
assume any risks.
3. Hospital and insurer work together in recording claims and processing of indemnity  payments.
34 Adopted  fom McCord  (2000b).
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risk management  through microinsurance, but also limitations.
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